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In this paper we review a number of coalitional solution concepts for the
analysis of cartel and merger stability in oligopoly. We show that,
although so far the industrial organization and the cooperative game
theoretic literature have proceeded somehow independently on this topic,
the two approaches are highly inter-connected. We show that different
assumptions on the behaviour and on the timing of the coalitions of firms
yield very different results on the associations of firms which are stable.
We conclude by reviewing some recent extensions of the coalitional
analysis to oligopolistic markets with heterogeneous firms and incom-
plete information.
1 INTRODUCTION
Since the seminal work by Salant et al. (1983) on merger profitability, there
has been a large interest in the stability of collusive agreements between firms
in oligopoly, as in the case of cartels, mergers and alliances (e.g. d’Aspremont
et al., 1982; Deneckere and Davidson, 1985; Perry and Porter, 1985;
d’Aspremont and Gabszewicz, 1986; Donsimoni et al., 1986; Jaquemin and
Margareth, 1989; Rajan, 1989; Farrell and Shapiro, 1990; and also Huck
et al., 2005a, 2005b for an extensive survey). A relevant number
of the initial works on the topic has mainly focused on the conditions
under which a collusive agreement within one group of firms can be viewed
as stable when the remaining firms in the industry act either as price-takers
(d’Aspremont et al., 1982; Donsimoni et al., 1986, among others) or as
oligopolistic firms (see Shaffer, 1995). As in the traditional price-leadership
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model (Markham, 1951), in the above literature a group of dominant
firms is assumed to behave as one Stackelberg leader, i.e. taking as given the
reaction of the remaining firms in the fringe. Since in the absence of synergies
the cooperation within a cartel is formally equivalent to the outcome of a
horizontal merger, many of the results of the horizontal merger literature
also apply to the problem of cartel stability.1 However, differently from
the cartel literature, most of the works on horizontal mergers examine
the profitability of mergers in oligopolistic markets where a group of
colluding firms and a fringe of competitors take their strategic decisions
simultaneously.2
A common feature of both the approaches discussed above is the adop-
tion of a notion of individual stability: for a cartel (or merger) to be stable,
no firm of the fringe must have an incentive to enter the cartel (external
stability) and no firm of the cartel must have an incentive to exit the cartel
(internal stability). Recognizing the fact that this approach ‘. . . ignores the
possibility that a group of players might jointly make themselves better off
by leaving the cartel (Shaked, 1986)’, later contributions have, in various
ways, attempted to use a notion of coalitional stability to approach the
problem (see, for instance, d’Aspremont and Gabszewicz, 1986; Rajan,
1989, Zhao, 1997; Thoron, 1998). The main purpose there is to check
whether imputations exist under which a collusive agreement signed by all
firms in the industry is stable, i.e. immune to deviations by subcoalitions
of firms in the industry. As in the horizontal mergers literature, the stability
of an agreement is examined in a context in which a deviating coalition and
the remaining firms of the industry act simultaneously. In such a literature,
the sequential approach typical of the price-leadership model is, therefore,
missing. It may be questioned whether the defection of a group of firms
from a cartel and their defective market decisions have to be viewed as
happening either before or at the same time as the market decision of the
remaining firms. Clearly, some sequential structure would prove useful to
describe all those situations in which a coalition of firms can commit to a
joint (defective) strategy expecting outside firms to observe the effects of
such strategy and to optimally react to it.
The purpose of this paper is to review some recent applications
of cooperative games and of coalition formation games to the problem of
collusive agreements (e.g. cartels and mergers) in oligopoly. Our aim is to
highlight the implications of different game structures and equilibrium con-
1This equivalence holds in particular if the firms in the cartel are assumed to sign a binding
agreement on their joint prices or quantities.
2Other recent works on this topic also looks at the profitability of mergers under non-
linear demand (Cheung, 1992; Faulí-Oller, 1997), strategic delegation in mergers
(Gonzalez-Maestre and Lopez-Cunat, 2001; Ziss, 2001), mergers under incomplete infor-
mation (Amir et al., 2009), mergers and cartels with Stackelberg leaders and followers
(Daughety, 1990; Huck et al., 2001; Escrihuela-Villar and Faulí-Oller, 2008).
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cepts for the final configuration of the industry. To examine this question, we
first introduce the notion of core of a cooperative TU-game and then apply it
to check the stability of a merger or a cartel made of all firms in the industry.
We show that while the simultaneous approach to cartel formation has led to
the notions of gamma-core and delta-core (see, for instance, Chander and
Tulkens, 1997, and, more recently, Lardon, 2012), the sequential approach
has led to a core notions based on the assumption that deviating coalitions
act as Stackelberg leaders in setting their market strategies (see Currarini and
Marini, 2003, 2004). We are so able to clarify and extend some classical
results on merger stability contained, for instance, in Rajan (1989).
Obviously, the formation of collusive structures which are different from
the whole association of firms in the industry represent a concrete option
for firms competing in oligopoly. The recent developments in the theory of
endogenous coalition formation provides, in this respect, a new set of game-
theoretic tools to study this problem (Hart and Kurz, 1983; Bloch, 1995; Ray
and Vohra, 1997; Yi, 1997; and also Bloch, 1997, 2002, 2003; Yi, 2003;
Marini, 2009, for updated surveys of the literature). In all these works, the
formation of competing associations of firms is modelled as a two-stage
process: in a first stage players form coalitions, while at the second stage the
formed coalitions interact in the resulting market structure. A basic difference
among the various models lies on the timing assumed for the coalition for-
mation game, which can be either simultaneous (Hart and Kurz, 1983; Ray
and Vohra, 1997; Yi, 1997) or sequential (Bloch, 1995; Ray and Vohra, 1999).
Another remarkable difference lies in the timing of the strategic settings used
to model second stage market competition.
We therefore focus here specifically on role of timing of the oligopoly
game. To this aim we make an attempt to extend the logic of Hamilton and
Slutsky’s (1990) two-player endogenous timing game to the formation of
coalitions of firms. In particular we construct a model in which firms
announce the time at which they wish to play the oligopoly game, as well as
the coalitions they wish to belong to. We assume that these announce-
ments induce a profile of coalitions according to a unanimity rule: a coalition
forms if and only if all its members agree to belong to that coalition, and
study the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium of the coalition formation
and timing game. Applying this framework of endogenous timing to
the oligopoly problem allows us to set in a broader perspective a number of
recent results on mergers profitability with Stackelberg leaders and followers
(e.g. Daughety, 1990; Huck et al., 2001, 2005a, 2005b).
Finally, in a conclusive section, we review some recent results obtained
by the coalitional approach in Cournot oligopoly games in which firms either
are heterogeneous (in terms of cost or demand structures) or possess private
information either on market conditions or on rival firms.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces a basic
quantity oligopoly game that is used as the underlying strategic form game
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throughout the paper. Section 3 is devoted to the formation of the industry-
wide alliance of firms and, for this reason, it reviews the results obtained
applying the notion of core to the analysis of collusive agreements in quantity
setting oligopolies. Section 4 considers the stability of partial cartels and
mergers and reviews some recent approaches adopted to model the endog-
enous formation of coalitions of firms, with a special attention to the issue of
timing. Section 5 present some recent applications of the coalitional approach
to oligopoly games in presence of heterogeneous firms and of incomplete
information. Section 6 concludes.
2 A QUANTITY OLIGOPOLY GAME
Let the profit function of every firm i ∈ N = {1, 2, . . ., n} be defined as
π i i i i iy y p y y C y,( ) = ( ) − ( )
where yi is the output of each firm, y yin i= =1∑ the total industry output,
p(y) the inverse demand function and Ci(yi) the cost function of every firm.
Let also Ci(·) = Cj(·), for every i, j in N. Thus, we can represent the Cournot
oligopoly through the following strategic form game, G = ({Yi, πi}i∈N,
{YS}S⊆N). In such a game the set of players is represented by the set of firms
N and every firm’s strategy set is defined as
Y y R y yi i i i= ∈ ≤{ }+ :
where yi is a capacity constraint. For every coalition of firms S ⊆ N, we can
equivalently define the coalitional strategy set Y YS
S
i= ∏ . We make the fol-
lowing standard assumptions:
A.1 The function πi(·) and Ci(·) are twice continuously differentiable for
every i = 1, . . ., n;
A.2 For every i ∈ N, the capacity constraint yi < ∞ determines the
maximum production level;
A.3 For every i ∈ N, p″(·)yi + p′(·) < 0 and ′ ⋅( )− ′′<p Ci 0.
Definition 1: A (Cournot) Nash equilibrium of G is a strategy profile y* such
that, for all i ∈ N, y Yi i∗ ∈ and, for all yi ∈ Yi, π πi i i iy y y*( ) ≥ ∗−( , ).
Proposition 1: There exists a unique (Nash) equilibrium of the game G.
Proof: By Assumptions A.1, A.2 and A.3 every player’s pay-off functions is
continuous in the strategy profile yN and strictly concave on yi. Strategy sets
are non-empty, compact and convex ( y yi i≤ < ∞( ), so that existence of a
Nash equilibrium follows. Uniqueness is proved as follows. By Assumption
A.3, the function Φ y y p y y p y C yi i i i,( ) ≡ ′ ( ) + ( )− ′( ) is decreasing both in yi
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and in y. In fact, ∂ ( ) ∂ = ′ − ′′<Φ y y y p Ci i i, 0 and ∂Φ (yi, y)/∂y = p″yi + p′ < 0.
Suppose now that there exist two Nash Equilibria y yn11 1, ,…( ) and y yn12 2, ,…( )
of G. Equilibrium conditions require that, for each i
Φ y yi1 1 0,( ) =
and
Φ y yi2 2 0,( ) =
Thus, if y yi i1 2> , then y2 > y1. This in turns implies that y yj j1 2> for all
j, contradicting the fact that y2 > y1. Therefore, it must be that y yi i1 2= for all
i ∈ N. ■
3 INDUSTRY-WIDE AGREEMENTS
In this section we concentrate on industry-wide collusive agreements—i.e.
cartels that comprise all firms in the industry. A stable collusive agreements
distributes to its members enough profits to discourage the formation of
alternative agreements by subcoalitions of firms. The stability of an industry-
wide cartel can be formulated in terms of the existence of core imputations in
an appropriately defined cooperative game in characteristic function.
3.1 Cooperative Games and Coalitional Worths
The purpose of a cooperative game is to describe the strategic possibilities of
players and coalitions in a bargaining situation. Cooperative games abstract
from the details of the strategic environment, and build directly on a speci-
fication of what each coalition would be able to achieve without the help of
outside players (that, should negotiations fail). These coalitional worths act
as outside options that players consider in the bargaining process.
Definition 2: A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU cooperative
game) is a pair (N, v), where N = {1, 2, . . ., i, . . ., N} is a finite set of players
and v N: 2 → +R is a mapping (characteristic function) assigning a value or
worth to every non-empty feasible coalition S ∈ 2N.3
As we said, the worth v(S) is the pay-off that coalition S would expect to
receive if its members were to jointly cease to cooperates with the remaining
players in N\S. An imputation for the game (N, v) specifies the way in which
the aggregate pay-off is distributed across players, and is a vector z ∈ +Rn such
that ∑ ≤ ( )∈i N iz v N (feasibility) and zi ≥ v({i}) (individual rationality) for all
i ∈ N.
3Here we mainly deal with games with transferable utility. In games without transferable utility,
the worth of a coalition associates with each coalition a players’ utility frontier (a vector of
utilities).
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The core of a cooperative game consists of all imputations which are
robust to coalitional deviations, i.e. which distribute to each coalition S at
least its worth v(S) in the game.
Definition 3: The core of a TU cooperative game (N, v) is the set of all
imputations z ∈ +Rn such that ∑ ≥ ( )∈i S iz v S for all S ⊆ N.
In this section we will review how the notion of core of a cooperative
game has been used to investigate the stability of industry-wide agreements.
The fact that, in the present Cournot game, only industry-wide agreements
are candidate for core is straightforward: since the grand coalition N gener-
ates more pay-off than any other partition of the set of players, N would
profitably object to any imputation proposed by such partition, and distrib-
ute the monopoly profit across firms in the appropriate way. In other words,
the notion of core of a cooperative game is only apt to investigate under
which conditions firms can collude by means of industry-wide agreements.
Other notions of stability and game forms which admit the formation of
smaller cartels are discussed in the next section.
When trying to apply the notion of core to our Cournot game, we note
that the implicit strategic independence of firms’ profits poses a problem in
defining the worth v(S) for a generic coalition S. In fact, the profit that S can
achieve by itself crucially depend on the way in which firms outside S are
organized. This suggests that deriving a function v for the Cournot oligopoly
game requires assumptions on the pattern of agreements that would emerge
among firms in N\S (or, more precisely, are expected to emerge) should S
drop from the industry-wide agreement. In what follows we discuss the main
approaches taken in the literature, and the implications of these approaches
for the stability of an industry-wide cartel.
3.2 α- and β-characteristic functions
The concepts of α- and β-core, formally studied by Aumann (1967), are based
on von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944) early proposal of representing
the worth of a coalition as pay-off it can guarantee its members in the
underlying strategic form game. Accordingly, the characteristic function v(S)
for an oligopoly game is obtained by assuming that firms outside a deviating
coalition S act in order to minimize the profit of firms in S. The
β-characteristic function assumes that members of S choose their strategy
after the other firms:
v S y y
y y
i S N Si SN S S
β π( ) minmax ( , )
\
\=
∈∑ (1)
and represents what firms in S cannot be prevented from getting. Alternatively,
if members of S move first, we have
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v S y y
y y
i S N Si SS N S
α π( ) max min ( , )
\
\=
∈∑ (2)
denoted α-characteristic function, which represents what firms in S can guar-
antee themselves, when they expect a retaliatory behaviour from the comple-
ment coalition N\S.4
When the underlying strategic form game G is zero-sum, (1) and (2)
coincide. In the present oligopoly game they differ and vα(S) < vβ(S) for all
S ⊂ N.
Both the α- and the β-characteristic functions are based on expectations
(by S) of irrational behaviour by the firms in N\S. To be sure, the minimizing
behaviour of outside firms is here not meant to represent the expectation of
S but rather as a mathematical way to determine the lower bound of S’s
aggregate pay-off). Still, this approach has important drawbacks, as the
heavy retaliations that follow coalitional objections typically yield very large
cores.
3.3 Simultaneous Interaction among Coalitions: the γ and
δ-characteristic Function
Another way to define the characteristic function in games with externalities
is to assume that in the event of a deviation from N, a coalition S plays à la
Nash with the remaining firms.5 Here, different approaches assume different
ways in which firms in N\S get organized before setting quantities. The
γ-approach assumes that outside firms cease to collude altogether, and
remain organized as singletons. Consequently, the strategy profile induced by
the deviation of a coalition S ⊂ N is the Cournot equilibrium among S and
each individual firms in N\S. This is the set-up implicitly underlying papers
like Salant et al. (1983) and Rajan (1989) to analyse the profitability of firms’
collusion. Thus, the characteristic function vγ(S) can be defined for every
S ⊆ N as
v S y yi S j j N S
i S
γ π( ) ,{ } \= ∗ ∗( )∈
∈
∑ (3)
where
y y yS
y Y
i S j j N S
i SS S
∗
=
∗( )
∈
∈
∈
∑arg max ,{ } \π (4)
and ∀j ∈ N\S,
4Note that firms outside S are treated as one coalition, so the implicit assumption here is that
firms in N\S stick together after S departure from the grand coalition N.
5This way to define the worth of a coalition as a non-cooperative equilibrium pay-off of a game
played between coalitions was first proposed by Ichiishi (1983).
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y y y yj
y Y
j S k k N S j j
j j
∗
=
∗ ∗( )
∈
∈( ) { }arg max ,{ } ,\ \π (5)
where y y yn* = ∗ ∗( , , )1 … is characterized by the following n first-order condi-
tions (FOCs):
p y p y y C y i Si
i S
i i* * for all( ) + ′ ( ) = ′ ∗ ∈
∈
∑ ( ) (6)
p y p y y y C y j N Sj S j j* * for all \( ) + ′ ( ) ∗ ∗ = ′ ∗ ∈( ) ( ) (7)
An alternative approach assumes that firms react to the formation of
coalition S by forming the complementary coalition N\S. This approach
yields the following δ-characteristic function:
v S y yi S N S
i S
δ π( ) ( , )\= ∗ ∗
∈
∑ (8)
where
y y yS
y Y
i S N S
i SS S
∗
=
∗
∈ ∈
∑arg max ( , )\π
y y yN S
y Y
j S N S
j N SN S N S
\ \
\
arg max ( , )
\ \
∗
=
∗
∈
∈
∑ π
In both cases, for (3) and (8) to be well defined, the Nash equilibrium of
the strategic form game played among coalitions must be unique. This can be
shown to hold under the same assumptions as in Proposition 1 above.
3.4 Sequential Interactions among Coalitions: the λ-characteristic Function
Both the γ- and the δ-characteristic functions are obtained under an implicit
assumption on the dynamics of coalitional deviations. In particular, it is there
assumed that the choice of a joint strategy by S in the underlying oligopoly
game is made after the deviation takes place and the new coalition structure
(in which S is embedded and with respect to which a Nash equilibrium is
defined) has emerged. In other terms, it is implicitly assumed that in a first
stage coalition S forms and remaining firms react either splitting up as
singletons or merging; in a second stage, optimal strategies are simultane-
ously chosen both by the deviating coalition of firms and by excluded firms.
A different dynamic could also be envisaged, in which the deviating
coalition sets its quantity before the remaining firms react to the deviation,
reintroducing the temporal structure typical of α- and β-assumptions.6 If,
6See Currarini and Marini (2003, 2004) for more details.
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for instance, excluded firms are assumed to slip up into singletons (as in the
γ approach), a deviating coalition S would moves first anticipating the
optimal reaction of the fringe firms N\S, who simultaneously choose their
best response as singletons. The strategy profile associated with the deviation
of a coalition S would be in this case the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game
in which S is the leader and players in N\S are, individually, the followers. We
denote this strategy profile as a Stackelberg equilibrium with respect to S.
Formally, this is the strategy profile ! ! !y S y y yS j S( ) = ( ), ( ) such that
!
!
y y y yS
y Y
i S j S j N S
i SS
= { }( )
∈
∈
∈
∑arg max , ( ) \π (9)
and, ∀j ∈ N\S,
y y y y y yj S
y Y
j S k S k N S j j
j j
( ) arg max , ( ) ,\ \= { }( )
∈
∈( ) { }π (10)
Conditions under which there exists a Stackelberg equilibrium with
respect to S are now established. For every coalition of firms S ⊂ N and
strategy profile yS ∈ YS, let G(N\S, yS) denote the restriction of the game G to
the set of firms N\S, given the strategy profile yS.
Proposition 2: For every coalition of firms S ⊂ N there exists a Stackelberg
equilibrium with respect to S.
Proof: By condition (10) and Proposition 1, the strategy profile {yj(yS)}j∈N\S is
the unique Nash equilibrium of G(N\S, yS). By the closedness of the Nash
equilibrium correspondence (see, for instance, Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991,
p. 30), the members of S maximize a continuous function over a compact set
(Assumption A.2); thus, by Weierstrass theorem, a maximum exists. ■
Using (9) and (10) we can then define the joint pay-off (or worth) of
every coalition of firms vλ(S) in the sequential case as uniquely defined by the
following:
v S y y yi S j S j N S
i S
λ π( ) , ( ) \= { }( )∈
∈
∑ ! ! (11)
where ! !y y yS j S, ( )( ) is a Stackelberg equilibrium with respect to S and the
vector ! !y yn1, ,…( ) is fully characterized by the following n-FOCs:
p y p y n s y y y C y i Sj S i
i S
i i! ! ! ! !( ) + ′ ( ) + − ( )( ) = ′( ) ∈
∈
∑1 ( ) for all (12)
p y p y y y C y y j N Sj S j j S! ! ! !( ) + ′ ( ) ( ) = ′ ( )( ) ∈for all \ (13)
where y yj i S i∑( )∈ ! is the Nash equilibrium strategy of each player in the
game G N S yS\ , !( ). Obviously, vλ(S) ≥ vγ(S). Similarly, the γ-assumption can
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be modified by assuming that a deviating coalition S plays as follower against
all remaining players in N\S acting as singleton leaders. Obviously, the same
can be done under the δ-assumption.
3.5 Some Results in a Linear Cournot Oligopoly
We first introduce a linear oligopoly, i.e. an oligopoly game such that p(y) =
max{a − by, 0} and, for every firm i ∈ N, Ci(yi) = cyi. The constraints on the
parameters are: a > c ≥ 0 and b > 0.
3.5.1 α- and β-core. Under α- and β-assumptions, if either an individual
firm or a group of firms leave the grand coalition N, the remaining firms play
a minimizing strategy such that, for every S⊂N, vα(S) = vβ(S) = 0. In this case,
the core simply coincides with the set of Pareto-efficient imputations (see, for
example, Zhao, 1999). The predictive power of the α- and β-core is, therefore,
minimal for the oligopoly game.
3.5.2 γ-core and δ-core. According to the definition (3), under the
γ-assumption the worth of a group of firms S is given by
v S p y y y C yS S i i i
i S
γ ( ) = −⎡⎣ ⎤⎦−
∈
∑ ( *, * ) * ( *) (14)
For the linear case introduced above, this equals to
v S y n s y a by y cy
y
S S j S S
S
γ π( ) = −( )( ) = −( ) −max ,
where, using the firms’ symmetry within each coalition, y = syi + (n − s)yj. As
a result, the FOC of every coalition S is
a by b n s y cS j− − − − =2 0( )
and its joint best reply function writes as
y n s y
a c b n s y
bS j
j
−( )( ) = − − −( )
2
(15)
Note that, by considering separately the FOC of every i ∈ S, we would
obtain individual best reply functions:
y n s y
a c b n s y
bsi j
j
−( )( ) = − − −( )
2
(16)
and the analysis proceeds exactly as above summing up every i-firm’s best
reply. On the other hand, every firm j ∈ N\S playing as singleton maximizes
π j j k
k N S j
S j S k j jy n s y y a by by b n s y y cy( , ( ) , ) ( ( ) )
\ \
− − = − − − − − −
∈( )
1 1
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with FOCs
a by b n s y by cj k
k N S j
s− − − −( ) − − =
∈( )
2 1 0
\ \
Again, using firms’ symmetry, every j’s best reply can be written as
y y
a by c
b n sj S
S( ) = − −
− +( )1 (17)
Thus, by (15) and (16) we obtain
y
a c
b n s
y
a c
b n sS j
∗
=
−
− +( )
∗
=
−
− +2 2
and
( )
To obtain vγ(S), we first compute market price as
p y a by b n s y
a n s c
n sS j
*( ) = − ∗ − − ∗ = + − +( )
− +
( )
( )
1
2
and then
v S y p y y cy
a c
b n sii S
S S Sγ π π( ) = ( ) = = ( ) ∗ − ∗ = −( )
− +∈
∑ * *
2
22( )
(18)
Note that, for s = n,
v N
a c
bγ
( ) = −( )
2
4
(19)
Proposition 3: In the linear quantity oligopoly game, the γ-core is non-empty
and strictly includes the equal split allocation.
Proof: We know from (18) and (19) that
v N
a c
bγ
( ) = −( )
2
4
and
v S
a c
b n s
γ ( ) = −( )
− +( )
2
22
Without loss of generality we normalize (a − c)2/b = 1, so that the equal-split
allocation gives to each firm in the industry-wide agreement {N} a pay-off
of vγ(N)/|N| = 1/4n, where n = |N|. Consider now the equal-split allocation of
any coalition of firms S, vγ(S)/|S| = 1/s(n − s + 2)2, where s = |S|. For any
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distribution of the coalition worth vγ(S), at least one player in S cannot get a
pay-off higher than 1/s(n − s + 2)2. This implies that a coalition S can improve
upon the equal split allocation in N if and only if
1
2
1
42s n s n− +( ) >
Straightforward calculations show that the above inequality is satisfied
respectively for
s n>
s
n n n
< +
− +
<2
8
2
1
2
s
n n n
n> +
+ +
>2
8
2
2
and, hence, it is never satisfied for 1 < s ≤ n. It follows that the equal-split
allocation of the industry-wide merger {N} belongs to the γ-core. To see that
this allocation is strictly included in the γ-core, note that, since individual
deviations assign to a player just vγ({i}) = 1/(n + 1)2 < vγ(N)/n = 1/4n, different
and unequal allocations also belong to the γ-core. In particular, any alloca-
tion giving to a player i his worth vγ({i}) and [vγ(N) − vγ({i})]/(n − 1) to any
remaining player in N, cannot be objected. ■
The following result concerning the δ-core can also be proved.
Proposition 4: In the linear quantity oligopoly, the δ-core is empty.
Proof: Under the δ-assumption, if a coalition of firmsS leaves the grand coali-
tion, a simultaneous duopoly game is played between S and remaining firms in
N\S acting as a unique coalition. As a result, vδ(S) = (1/s)[(a − c)2/9b] and the
most profitable deviation is made by a single firm: v({i}) = (a − c)2/9b, which is
bigger than vδ(N)/n = (a − c)2/4nb for n > 2. Therefore, the core is empty. ■
3.5.3 The Sequential Characteristic Function and the λ-core. According to
(11), in the sequential case the worth of a coalition S of firms can be defined
as
v S p y y y y C yS j S j N S i i S
i S
λ ( ) = ( ){ }( ) − ( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦∈
∈
∑ ! ! ! !, \ (20)
As before, the followers j ∈N\S maximize their individual pay-offs πj for
every given yS and their best replies are
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y y
a by c
b n sj S
S( ) = − −
− +( )1 (21)
The coalition S acts as a leader and maximizes
π i i
i S
h
h S i
j Sy s y n s y y( , ( ) , ( ) ( ))
\
− −
∈ ∈ { }
∑ 1
which is equivalent to
πS j S S
S
S Sn s y y a by b n s
a by c
b n s
y cy( ) ( )− ( )( ) = − − − − −
− +( )
⎛⎝ ⎞⎠ −1
The FOC for the maximization problem of the coalition playing as a
leader writes as
a by n s
a c by
n s
cS
S
− − −
− −( )
− +( ) − =2
2
1
0( )
from which
! !y a c
b
y y
a c
b n sS j S
=
− ( ) = −
− +( )2 2 1and (22)
Therefore, in order to obtain vλ(S) we first compute the equilibrium
price:
p y a by b n s y y
a n s c c
n sS j S
! ! !( ) = − − − ( ) = + −( ) +
− +( )( )
2
2 1
(23)
and, hence,
v S y n s y y p y c y
a c
b n sS S j S Sλ
π( ) = − ( )( ) = ( )−[ ] = −( )
− +
! ! ! !, ( )
( )
2
4 1
(24)
Again, the worth of the grand coalition (n = s) is obtained as
v N
a c
bλ
( ) = −( )
2
4
(25)
Proposition 5: In the linear quantity oligopoly, the equal-split efficient allo-
cation is the unique element of the λ-core.
Proof: Again, without loss of generality, let (a − c)2/b = 1, so that the equal-
split allocation assigns to each firm in N a pay-off of vλ(N)/n = 1/4n and vλ(S)
= 1/4(n − s + 1). We first show that the equal split allocation belongs to the
core. Consider the value vλ(S)/s for any arbitrary coalition S. For every S such
that s ≤ n
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v S
s s n s n
v N
n
λ λ( )
=
− +( ) ≤ =
( )1
4 1
1
4
(26)
In fact, the above inequality reduces to
s n s n− +( ) ≥1 (27)
which is satisfied for n ≥ s. Thus, if a coalition S forms, at least one firm in
S will receive a pay-off not greater than vλ(S)/s and, therefore, less than or
equal to vλ(N)/n. This implies that the equal-split allocation is in the λ-core.
To see that the equal-split is the unique allocation in the λ-core, note that (27)
is satisfied with equality only for s = n and s = 1. This means that vλ({i}) =
vλ(N)/n for all i ∈ N. Thus, consider an allocation z′ different from the
equal-split allocation. In z′, some player j will receive a pay-off vj < vλ(N)/n.
Player j can thus improve upon z′ obtaining vλ({i}) = vλ(N)/n, which implies
that z′ is not in the λ-core. ■
The λ-core is non-empty and selects a unique symmetric allocation out
of the γ-core, which instead includes a continuum of asymmetric allocations.
The λ-core can be therefore viewed as a refinement of the γ-core, one that
selects the ‘most reasonable’ optimal allocation (the equal-split) if applied to
a symmetric quantity oligopoly setting.
3.6 Oligopoly with Quadratic Costs
We can now consider the case of firms with quadratic cost functions. We
know from Rajan (1989) that, in this case, for n = 2, n = 3 and n = 4 the γ-core
is non-empty. We now show that this result does not extend to the λ-core. For
simplicity, let C y yi i i( ) = 2 2 and p(y) = max{0, (a − y)}.
Proposition 6: In a linear demand and quadratic cost quantity oligopoly, the
λ-core may be empty.
Proof: Straightforward calculations show that
v N
a n
n
λ ( ) =
+( )
2 2
21 2
and
v i
a a n
n n
λ { }( ) = + −( )
+( ) +( )
2 2
2
5 1
1 5
It is easy to see that, for every i ∈ N and n ≥ 2, vλ({i}) = vλ(N)/n and this
proves that any firm can improve upon the equal-split allocation by deviating
as singleton. This, in turn, implies that the λ-core is empty. ■
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4 STABLE ASSOCIATIONS OF FIRMS
Even in contexts where the grand coalition maximizes the joint profit of
players (as in the oligopoly game outlined in this survey), investigating the
conditions under which smaller coalitions form and possibly coexist is of
crucial importance. This both because of the widespread empirical evidence
of fragmentation of cooperation, which is unlikely to merely reflect conges-
tion or decreasing returns to size, and because it raises strategic consider-
ations that are overviewed by the cooperative approach based on the core
concept. In this section we first briefly review some of the games and equi-
librium concepts used to study the emergence of multiple coalitions, and then
we record the main results that these games and concepts imply for the
oligopoly game.
4.0.1 Partition Function. We start by introducing the notion of partition
function, a generalization of the characteristic function that suitable accom-
modates for the presence of strategic interaction in the game where players
choose to cooperate (Thrall and Lucas, 1963). The partition function specifies
the worth of each possible coalition as a function of the coalition structure
(i.e. the partition of the players’ set) in which it is embedded. Note that while
the derivation of a characteristic function from a genuine strategic form
game, discussed in the previous section, necessarily relied on assumptions
on how outside players react to the formation of a coalition, the partition
function simply specifies the pay-off of a coalition for every possible
organisation of outside players. One can, of course, use the partition function
as a primitive description of coalitional possibilities in the game, and obtain
various characteristic functions under different assumptions about how
players outside a forming coalition organize. This is the route we implicitly
followed when defining the notions of γ and δ-characteristic functions. Here
we will need to account for all possible partitions that result from players
cooperative decisions, and the general tool of the partition function will serve
this goal.
Definition 4: A partition function w S P N( , ) : 2 × → +P R is a map assigning
a worth to coalition S embedded in partition P ∈P, for all Sk ⊆ N
and all P = (S1, S2, . . ., Sm) such that Si ∩ Sj = ∅ for every i ≠ j and
!k m kS N= =1 2, , ,… .
To derive a partition function from a strategic form game, one simply
needs to associate with each possible partition a strategic profile for all
players in the game. Since Ichiishi (1983), the modern theory of coalition
formation adopts the view that players cooperate within coalitions and
compete à la Nash across coalitions. The partition function is therefore
derived by associating to each coalition S ∈ P the Nash equilibrium pay-off
in the game where each coalition acts as a single aggregate player maximiz-
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ing its members’ aggregate pay-off. In our oligopoly setting, this amounts to
assuming that within each collusive cartel, firms maximize aggregate profit
and compete à la Cournot with rival cartels.
4.0.2 Valuation. In modelling coalition formation as a non-cooperative
game in which players choose partners with whom to cooperate, a full descrip-
tion of the individual pay-offs resulting from all possible coalition structure is
needed. This can be done by specifying a fixed allocation rule distributing the
worth of a coalition (as this is imputed by the partition function) to all its
members. Such a fixed sharing rule gives rise to a per-member pay-off (valua-
tion) mapping coalition structures into vectors of individual pay-offs.
Definition 5: A valuation is a vector of functions vi, i = 1, 2, . . ., n, assigning
to each agent i ∈ S ∈ P a real number, for all S ⊂ N and P ∍ S.
4.1 Non-cooperative Games of Coalition Formation
Most recent approaches have looked at the process of coalition formation
as a strategy in a well defined game of coalition formation (see Bloch, 1997,
2003; Yi, 2003; Marini, 2009, for surveys). Within this new stream of litera-
ture, usually indicated as non-cooperative (or endogenous) coalition forma-
tion theory, the work by Hart and Kurz (1983) represents a seminal
contribution. Other seminal contributions along these lines include Shenoy
(1979), Bloch (1995, 1996), Ray and Vohra (1997, 1999) and Yi (1997). In all
these works, cooperation is modelled as a two-stage process: at the first stage
players form coalitions, while at the second stage coalitions interact in a well
defined strategic setting. This process is formally described by a coalition
formation game, in which a given rule of coalition formation maps players’
announcements of coalitions into a well defined coalition structure, which
in turns determines players’ pay-offs according to a valuation. A basic dif-
ference among the various models lies on the timing assumed in the coalition
formation game, which can be either simultaneous (e.g. Hart and Kurz, 1983;
Ray and Vohra, 1997; Yi, 1997; Currarini and Marini, 2006) or sequential
(Bloch, 1995; Ray and Vohra, 1999) as well as on the timing of the underlying
strategic form game that, we will see, can be similarly modelled as simulta-
neous or sequential.
4.1.1 Hart and Kurz’s Games of Coalition Formation. Hart and Kurz
adopt as a valuation a general version of the Owen value for TU-games
(Owen, 1977), i.e. a Shapley value with a priori coalition structures, that
they call coalitional Shapley value, and that assigns to every coalition struc-
ture a pay-off vector φi(P) in RN, such that (by an efficiency axiom)
∑ ( ) =∈i N i P v Nϕ ( ). Given this valuation, the game of coalition formation is
modelled as a game in which each player i ∈ N announces a coalition S to
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which he would like to belong; for each profile σ = (S1, S2, . . ., Sn) of
announcements, a partition P(σ) of N is induced. The rule P(σ) is clearly a
crucial issue for the prediction of which coalitions will emerge in equilibrium.
Hart and Kurz’s game Γ predicts that a coalition forms if and only if all its
members have declared it (hence the name of unanimity rule commonly used
to describe the game). Formally:
P S i Niσ σ( ) = ( ) ∈{ }:
where
S
S S S j S
ii
i i j i
σ( ) = = ∈{ }{ if for allotherwise
The alternative game Δ predicts instead that a coalition T emerges if and
only if all its members have declare the same coalition S (which may, in
general, differs from T). Formally:
P S N i j S S Si jσ( ) = ⊂ ∈ ={ }: , if and only if
Note that these two rules of coalition formation are ‘exclusive’ in the sense
that every player in a coalition has announced the list of its members. More-
over, in the game Γ this list has to be approved unanimously by all coalition
members. In addition, it can be noticed that the two rules generate different
partitions once a player decides to deviate from a coalition: in the Γ-game,
remaining players split-up in singletons; in the Δ-game, they stick together.
A stable coalition structure for the games Γ and Δ is defined as a parti-
tion induced by an equilibrium strategy profile in the game. We first define the
notion of strong Nash equilibrium, to be applied to the games Γ and Δ as a
coalitional refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept.
Definition 6: A strategy profile xˆ XN∈ for a game in strategic form G is a
strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) if there exists no S⊂N and ′ ∈x XS S such that
u x x u x i Si S N S i′( ) ≥ ( ) ∀ ∈, ˆ ˆ\
u x x u x h Sh S N S h′( ) > ( ) ∈, for someˆ ˆ\
Obviously, a SNE is both a Nash equilibrium and a Pareto-efficient
strategy profile; in addition it satisfy the Nash stability requirement for every
possible coalition. As a result, a SNE fails to exist in many economic prob-
lems and, in particular, whenever the Nash equilibria are not Pareto-efficient.
Definition 7: The partition P is a Nash stable (strong Nash stable) coalition
structure in the Γ(Δ) game of coalition formation if P P= ( )σˆ and σˆ is a Nash
equilibrium (strong Nash equilibrium) of the game Γ(Δ).
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To apply the above games of coalition formation to the present oli-
gopoly context, we need to first work out the valuations that result from
market competition in any coalition structure.
Following our previous assumptions (see Section 1.2) we can derived the
game G(P(σ)) from the strategic form oligopoly game G by assuming that
Y YS i S ik k= ∏ ∈ and π πS i S ik k= ∑ ∈ , for every coalition Sk ∈ P. We also assume
the valuation π πi S kk S= assigning to each member the per capita pay-off
of Sk. We can now compute the pay-off that a firm i ∈ Sk ⊂ N obtains if
all members of S deviate from the strategy profile that induces the grand
coalition by jointly declaring S. In this case, given the rules of the Γ-game, all
remaining firms split up in singletons). We obtain
π σγi y P
a c
s n s
* ′( )( )( ) = −( )
− +
2
22( )
where σ′ = ({S}i∈S, {N}j∈N\S).
Alternatively, the same coalitional deviation in the Δ-game would result
in the players outside S forming the complementary coalition N\S, and the
per capita pay-off in S is
π σδi y P
a c
s
* ′( )( )( ) = −( )
2
9
We can now present the following proposition.
Proposition 7: In a linear quantity oligopoly, the industry-wide merger
induced by the profile σ = ({N}i∈N) is a stable coalition structure of the Γ-game
of coalition formation. It is not a stable coalition structure of the Δ-game of
coalition formation.
Proof: It can be easily verified that
π πγ γi iy P N
a c
n
y P S
a c
s n s
* *{ }( )( )( ) = −( ) ≥ { }( )( )( ) = −( )
− +
2 2
24 2( )
for every s ≤ n and, therefore, the γ-stability of the whole industry agreement
(i.e. the strong Nash stability of announcement profile σ = ({N}i∈N) always
holds for the linear quantity oligopoly. Moreover,
π πγ δi iy P N
a c
n
y P S
a c
s
* *{ }( )( )( ) = −( ) < { }( )( )( ) = −( )
2 2
4 9
for s n< 49 . Therefore, if the firms participate to a merger smaller than about
40 per cent of the market and competing with the coalition of remaining
firms, they can obtain a higher profit than in the industry merger. Therefore
{N} is not stable under the Δ-coalition formation game. ■
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In the Γ-game of coalition formation, smaller mergers can be sustained
as Nash equilibria, as the next proposition illustrates.
Proposition 8: In linear quantity oligopoly, every coalition structure formed
by one association of firms greater than 80 per cent of the whole market
and competing with the fringe of remaining firms is a Nash stable coali-
tion structure of the Γ-game when induced by the announcement profile
σ = ({S}i∈S, {j}j∈N\S).
Proof: Under the Γ-game of coalition formation if a firm deviates individu-
ally from the coalition structure P = ({S}, {j}j∈N\S), it will induce the coalition
structure made of all singleton firms, i.e. P′ = ({i}i∈N). As a result,
π πγ γi j N S i i Ny S j
a c
s n s
y i
a c
* *{ } { }( )( ) = −( )
− +
≥ { }( )( ) = −(∈ ∈, ( )\
2
22
)
+
2
21( )n
for s n n n≥ + − +( )2 3 4 5 2 0 8" . (as in Salant et al., 1983). ■
4.1.2 Sequential Games of Coalition Formation. Bloch (1996, 1997) intro-
duces a sequential coalition-formation game with infinite horizon in which,
as in the Γ-game of Hart and Kurz (1983), a coalition forms if and only if all
its members have agreed to form exactly that coalition. The sequence of
moves of the coalition formation game is organized as follows. At the begin-
ning, the first player (according to a given ordering) makes a proposal for a
coalition to form. Then, the player on his list with the smallest index accepts
or rejects her proposal. If he accepts, it is the turn of the following player on
the list to accept or reject. If all players on the list accept the first player’s
proposal, the coalition is formed and the remaining players continue the
coalition formation game, starting with the player with the smallest index
who thus makes a proposal to remaining players. If any of the players has
rejected the first player’s proposal, the player who first rejected the proposal
starts proposing another coalition. Once a coalition forms, it cannot break
apart or merge with another player or a coalition of players. Bloch (1996)
shows that this game yields the same stationary subgame perfect equilibrium
coalition structure as a much simpler ‘size-announcement game’, in which
the first player announces the size of his coalition and the first s1 players
accept; then player is1 1+ proposes a size s2 coalition and this is formed and so
on, until the last player is reached. This equivalence is basically due to the ex
ante symmetry of players. It can also be shown that this size-announcement
game possesses a generically unique subgame perfect equilibrium coalition
structure.
For a linear Cournot oligopoly with more than two firms, Bloch’s (1996)
proves that his sequential game yields a generically unique subgame perfect
equilibrium. This is expressed in the next proposition.
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Proposition 9: In a linear quantity oligopoly, the coalition structure P = ({S},
{j}j∈N\S), with s = |S| equal to the first integer following 2 3 4 5 2n n+ − +( ) , is
the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinite-horizon sequential
game of coalition formation.
The explanation is as follows. We know that when a merger of size s
is formed in a Cournot market, the equal-split pay-off of each firm i ∈ S in
the merger is πi(y*({S}, {j}j∈N\S)) = (a − c)2/s(n − s + 2)2 which is greater
than the usual Cournot profit πi(y*({i}i∈N)) = (a − c)2/s(n − s + 1)2 only
for s n n> + − +( )2 3 4 5 2, which is the well-known 80 per cent market
size found in Salant et al. (1983). When a merger of size s is in place, each
independent firm outside the merger earns a higher profit than every member
of the merger, equal to πj(y*({S}, {j}j∈N\S)) = (a − c)2/(n − s + 2)2. Therefore, in
the sequential game of coalition formation, the first firms choose to remain
independent and free-ride on the merger formed by subsequent firms. When
the number of remaining firms is exactly equal to the Salant et al.’s (1983)
minimal profitable merger size they will prefer to merge, as it is no longer
profitable to remain independent.
4.1.3 Equilibrium Binding Agreement. Ray and Vohra (1997) propose a
different stability concept. In this solution concept, players start from some
coalition structures and are only allowed to break coalitions to smaller ones.
The deviations can be unilateral or multilateral (i.e. several players can
deviate together). The deviators take into account future deviations, both by
members of their own coalitions and by members of other coalitions. Devia-
tions to finer partitions must be credible, i.e. stable themselves, and therefore
the nature of the definition is recursive. We can start with a partition P and
we can denote by B(P) all coalition structures that are finer than P. A
coalition P′ ∈ B(P) can be induced from P if P′ is formed by breaking a
coalition in P. A coalition S is a perpetrator if it can induce P′ ∈ B(P) from
P. Obviously, S is a subcoalition of a coalition in P. Denote the finest
coalition structure, such that |S| = 1 for all S, by P0. There are no deviations
allowed from P0 and therefore P0 is by definition stable. Recursively, suppose
that for some P, all stable coalitions were defined for all P′ ∈ B(P), i.e. for
all coalition structures finer than P. Now, we can say that a strategy profile
(say a quantity profile of our oligopoly game) associated to a coalition
structure y(P) is sequentially blocked by y(P′) for P′ ∈ B(P) if (i) there exists
a sequence {y(P1), y(P2), . . ., y(Pm)} with y(P1) = y(P) and y(P′) = y(Pm);
(ii) for every j = 2, . . ., m, there is a deviator Sj that induces Pj from Pj−1; (iii)
y(P′) is stable; (iv) Pj is not stable for any y(Pj) and 1 < j < m; (v) πi(y(P0)) >
πi(y(Pj−1)) for all i ∈ Sj and j = 2, . . ., m.
Definition 8: y(P) is an equilibrium binding agreement if there is no y(P′) for
P′ ∈ B(P) that sequentially blocks y(P).
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Applying the equilibrium binding agreement to the linear oligopoly
game, mix results are obtained.
Proposition 10: In a three-firm oligopoly beside P0 = ({1}, {2}, {3}), which
is by definition stable, also the grand coalition strategy profile y(P) with
P = ({1, 2, 3}) is an equilibrium binding agreement. With n-firms there exists
a cyclical pattern, in which the grand coalition may or not be stable. For n =
3, 4, 5 it is stable, but not for n = 6, 7, 8. For n = 9 is again stable and so on,
with a somehow unpredictable pattern.
As explained by the authors, ‘The grand coalition survives if there
exist large zones of instability in intermediate coalition structures’ (Ray and
Vohra, 1997, p. 73).
4.2 Endogenous Timing in Coalition Formation
As noted by Huck et al. (2005b), one way to reconcile the theory of mergers
in quantity oligopoly with some well-known empirical facts is to remove
the assumption that merging firms set their quantities simultaneously with
the other competitors. If firms affiliated to a merger can freely inform
each others of their decisions whereas other firms do not possess the same
information, mergers can act as Stackelberg leaders with respect to external
firms. This would help the model to match a few empirically observed facts,
e.g. the existence of advantageous horizontal mergers even with no convex
costs (Office of Fair Trading, 1999), the welfare gains from mergers (see, for
example, Federal Trade Commission, 1999) and the negative externalities for
the external firms as result of a merger (Banerjee and Eckard, 1998).
Given the relevance of timing for mergers, in this section we model
endogenous timing (see, for the case of two firms, Hamilton and Slutsky,
1990) within the framework of coalition formation.7 As in the extended game
with observable delay by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), we add to the oli-
gopoly game a preplay stage t0 in which every firm i ∈N makes an announce-
ment σi = (S, τ) ∈ 2N × {t1, t2} that specifies both its preferred coalition and
time of play. The announcements’ profile σ = (σ1, σ2, . . ., σn) for the n firms
induces a partition endowed with a given timing of play (a timing coalition
structure) P S S S Sk mτ τ τ τ τ= ( )1 2, , , , ,… … , using Hart and Kurz’s (1983) Γ or
unanimity rule (see above). Formally:
P S S S Sk mτ τ τ τ τσ( ) = ( )1 2, , , , ,… … (28)
such that
∀ ∈ ( ) = { } = = ( ) ∈
{ }
i N i S
S S i h S
i
k
k i h k k
,
, ,
∋ τ
τ τ τ
τ
σ
σ σ τif for all
otherwise
⎧⎨⎩ (29)
7For an application of this logic to the formation of R&D cartels, see Marini et al. (2014).
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We will denote by L( )σ the set of all coalitions of firms that end up
playing the basic game at stage one (leaders) according to the announce-
ments’ profile σ, and by F ( )σ the set of all coalitions of firms that play
the basic game at stage two (followers). As in Hamilton and Slutsky (1990),
when either L( ) { }σ = ∅ (all firms announce τ = t2) or F ( ) { }σ = ∅ (all firms
announce τ = t1) the coalitions play simultaneously (at stage 1 or 2, respec-
tively). As the following example show, the coalition formation rule described
above unambiguously maps the set of players’ announcements into the set
of feasible timing coalition structures (CS) of the n firms, that we denote by
Pτ N( ).
Example 1: (Two-player case) ∀i = 1, 2, with i ≠ j, each firm announcement
set is given by
∑ = { }( ) { }( ) { }( ) { }( )[ ]i i j t i j t i t i t, , , , , , , , ,1 2 1 2
The set of feasible timing coalition structures that can be induced by the 16
different announcement profiles σ ∈ Σ1 × Σ2, is
Pτ N t t t t
t t
( ) = { }( ) { }( ) { } { }( )⎡⎣
{ } { }( ) { }
1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2 1
1 2 1 1
2 2
, , , , ,
, , t t t t1 2 2 12 1 2, , ,{ }( ) { } { }( )⎤⎦
Note that, in general, the cardinality of Pτ N( ) can be determined by the
formula
Pτ N B n k B n B n nk
k
n
n( ) = ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
=
−
∑ ( , ) ( , ) ( , )2 1 2 2
2
1
(30)
where B(n, k) is the corresponding Bell number (or Stirling number of second
type), i.e. the number of ways a set of cardinality n can be partitioned into
exactly k non-empty subsets (coalitions) S ⊂ N.8
A concept of stable timing coalition structure can thus be defined as a
feasible Pτ(σ) induced by a strong Nash equilibrium σˆ of the coalition timing
game
C N y Pi i i N= { }( )∈, , ( ( ( ))Σ π στ
What is basically required for stability is that no coalition of firms can
improve upon this profile of announcement, thus inducing a different timing-
coalition structure.
For a symmetric oligopoly with no discount it can be shown that:
8The set P τ becomes very large when the number of players increase. To give an example,
for N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, P N B k B Bkn k( ) = ∑ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅ +=−21 5 2 35 2 5 4 2 5 5 2 15 2 25 2( , ) ( , ) ( , )
⋅
410 2 + ⋅ + ⋅ =1 2 1 2 4545 .
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(1) The announcement profile that induces the grand coalition of firms
playing cooperatively at period two is a strong Nash equilibrium when
firm actions are strategic complements (in the sense of Bulow et al., 1985);
(2) The announcement profile that induces the grand coalition of firms
playing cooperatively at period one is a strong Nash equilibrium when
firm actions are strategic substitutes.
The intuition behind these results is as follows. All firms playing simul-
taneously and cooperatively at stage two ( N t{ } 2 ) is stable if every individual
firm acting as follower at stage t2 is better off than any firm in any coalition
acting as leader at stage t1. If this is the case a deviating coalition S ⊂N from
the grand coalition N t{ } 2 announcing either ′ = { }( )σS S t, 2 or ′′ = { }( )σS S t, 1
would induce either the simultaneous partition
P S jS
t
j N S
tτ σ ′( ) = { } { }( )∈2 2, \ (31)
or the sequential partition
P S jS
t
j N S
tτ σ ′′( ) = { } { }( )∈1 2, \ (32)
where in both cases all firms in N\S play as singletons. Note also that if S
cannot improve upon N t{ } 2 as leader in partition (32) it would not improve
a fortiori by playing simultaneously in partition (31). Therefore, it is enough
to show that in partition (32) all firms in S (regardless its size) do not improve
upon N t{ } 2 . When firm actions in the market are strategic complements, it
can be proved that the pay-off of a symmetric firm acting as singleton fol-
lower against the coalition S playing as leader is always higher than the
pay-off of every firm in S.9 Hence, given the efficiency of the grand coalition,
it would be impossible for a coalition S to improve by deviating as leader.
Similarly, it can be shown that when firm actions are strategic substitutes a
coalition S ⊂ N made of followers is beaten by individual firms investing as
leaders, and therefore the partition N t{ } 1—made by the grand coalition of
firms investing at time t1—is strong Nash stable.
4.2.1 Linear Quantity Oligopoly. In the case of linear quantity oligopoly,
normalizing (a − c)2/b = 1, we can compute the profit of every firm in a generic
coalition structurePτ(σ) in which all associations of firms play simultaneously
π
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τ
τ
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+( )= …1 2 2
1
1
, , ,
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(33)
where |Pτ(σ)| indicates the number of coalitions in coalition structure Pτ, or as
Stackelberg leaders (L) and followers (F) in a coalition structure with sequen-
tial timing:
9For a formal proof of this statement see Currarini and Marini (2003, 2004).
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where L( )σ and F ( )σ represent the number of coalitions playing as leaders
and followers, respectively. The introduction of the endogenous timing shows
that no intermediate merger structures of firms can be stable if they occur at
time two. In this case a firm could, in fact, deviate as leader (announcing
σ i
ti= { } 1 ) and induce a coalition structure in which it plays as leader and all
remaining firms (organized in various groups) play as follower. It can be
proved that this new situation is at least as profitable for the leader as the
equal-split monopoly profit and, therefore, dominates the pay-off obtained in
any simultaneous (intermediate) coalition structure. The following proposi-
tion illustrates this point in detail. It also shows, from a different perspective,
that the well-know Salant et al.’s (1983) minimum size condition must hold
for a simultaneous merger to be stable at time t1.
Proposition 11: In a linear quantity oligopoly the only Nash stable coalition
structure at time t2 is the grand coalition of firms. A coalition structures at
time t1 of the form P S jt t j N S
t1 1 1
= { } { }( )∈, \ is Nash stable if and only if s ≥ 0.8n.
Proof: The first statement simply follows from the fact that any intermediate
partition P S S St t t mt2 2 2 21 2= ( ), , ,… can be profitably objected by one firm
announcing its intention to play as leader at time t1, i.e. declaring σ i
ti= { } 1 . In
this case the other firms in merger S ik
t2 ∋ would compete as individual fol-
lowers at time t2 whereas the remaining coalitions would play as followers.
Expression (34) shows that the worst pay-off for a firm i deviating as leader
occurs when all remaining (follower) firms play as singletons. Thus, if we
compare the pay-off obtained by an individual firm deviating as leader (when
outside firms play as individual followers) to the per capita pay-off obtainable
at the simultaneous coalition structure played at time t2, we get
π πi
t
N i
t
i k k m
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which holds for sk ≤ n and for any possible partition Pt2 ( )σ . The expression
above proves that in any intermediate coalition structure occurring at time t2
a firm receives less than one individual leader regardless of the way followers
organize in alliances. Only the grand coalition of firms playing at time t2, i.e.
P Nt t2 2= { } , cannot be profitably objected by an individual leader, since in this
case the equal split monopoly pay-off and the leader’s pay-off coincide. As a
result, the grand coalition is the unique Nash stable coalition structure at time
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t2. The second statement trivially follows from the fact that since a firm
deviating from P S jt t j N S
t1 1 1
= { } { }( )∈, \ ends up either playing as follower or, at
best, simultaneously in a n-firm oligopoly, it follows that any individual
deviation from a merger of size s ≥ 0.8n can never be profitable. ■
Comparing our model to some of the existing literature on sequential
mergers, we can observe that the case analysed by Huck et al. (2001) corre-
sponds to the case of m individual leaders playing against (n − m) individual
followers. In this specific case, if a leader and a follower merge and the two
firms become one leader, their overall profit will increase. Using (34) and (35),
π π πi j i iy m n m y m n m y m n m
m
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m n m n m ) >2 0
A first observation is that, although it is efficient to aggregate one leader
and one follower into one leading merger, their individual incentives may
differ under the equal split allocation. In particular, simple calculations show
that for a leader is never individually profitable to merge with a follower, in
case they expect to share equally the future profits, even if the merger reduces
the number of followers in the market. Moreover, our generalization based
on (33)–(35) adds new elements to the analysis. A follower playing as single-
ton against a merger of leaders has an incentive to join the merger only if its
size skL is approximately smaller than one-half of the market. Only under this
size the followers prefer to enter the merger rather than to play as singleton
and free-ride on the merger. In fact,
π πj
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j N S
t
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j N S
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1 2 1 21
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which is solved for sL < (n + 1)/2. Here, contrarily to Salant et al.’s (1983) the
merger acting as leader has to be sufficiently small to become profitable to the
followers.
5 EXTENSIONS
5.1 Heterogenous Firms
In order to preserve the tractability of the models, most of the wide literature
on collusive agreements under oligopoly commonly assumes ex ante symme-
try of firms in terms of both costs and demand. The main reason is that the
ex post symmetry (i.e. after the merger) of firms’ pay-offs is no longer guar-
anteed when coalitions of firms of different size compete in the market. If
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the analysis introduces additional sources of firms’ asymmetry, it becomes
extremely hard to obtain tractable results. This explains why the number of
papers that have studied the formation of alliances between heterogeneous
firms has been, so far, limited. For simplicity, we can organize the papers
dealing with coalitional agreements among heterogeneous firms in three
main groups: (i) works looking at the stability of mergers of heterogenous
firms in simultaneous-move oligopolies (e.g. Ebina and Shimizu, 2009;
Watanabe and Matsubayashi, 2013; Zhao, 2013); (ii) works looking at
the stability of mergers of heterogeneous firms in sequential oligopolies (e.g.
Escrihuela-Villar and Faulí-Oller, 2008; Driessen et al., 2011); (iii) works
looking at the formation of cost-reducing alliances by heterogeneous firms in
simultaneous-move oligopolies (Belleflamme, 2000).
(i) In a recent paper Zhao (2013) examines the stability of the grand
coalition of firms as well of other coalition structures under the α-, γ- and
δ-assumptions in a linear Cournot oligopoly with three firms having different
marginal costs. The author assumes that, in an alliance, firms can produce
at the lowest marginal cost (hypothesis known as transferrable technology).
Zhao’s (2013) main result is that whereas the α-core is non-empty for all
possible firms’ cost-differentials, the δ-core is non-empty only if either the two
inefficient firms are sufficiently small compared with the efficient one or their
cost-differentials are sufficiently high. It is also shown that when the cost
reduction from the merger are large enough, the grand coalition of firms is
socially efficient.
A number of papers have recently focused on the profitability and stabil-
ity of mergers in quantity oligopoly games with asymmetrically differentiated
goods. In a four-firm model, Ebina and Shimizu (2009) show that, when only
mergers between two firms are allowed, the incentive to merge is stronger
for firms producing the less differentiated goods. Moreover, if one group of
firms merge, the incentive to merge faced by remaining firms increases. In a
differentiated quantity oligopoly with three (or four firms), Watanabe and
Matsubayashi (2013) show that for any degree of product differentiation the
industry-wide merger is always stable under the γ-assumption. Under the
δ-assumption, the grand coalition may become stable only in presence of high
product differentiation. This is because, if products are highly differentiated
and a firm deviates from the grand coalition by expanding its output, the
remaining firms (in the complementary coalition) do not reduce much their
own outputs in response, and this makes the deviation unprofitable. Using
a linear quantity oligopoly with symmetrically differentiated goods, Lekeas
(2013) introduces a concept of core in which a deviating coalition expects
the formation of at least a given number of coalitions (or more) among the
remaining firms. The worth of a coalition is thus defined as the minimum worth
that a coalition can obtain over all possible partitions of the remaining firms.
It is proved that when goods are complements, the grand coalition is always
stable (and the core non-empty) irrespective of the beliefs of the agents of any
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deviating coalition S. If goods are substitutes, the core is non-empty provided
that a deviating coalition believes its opponents will form a sufficient number
of coalitions. Since it was already proved (e.g. Currarini and Marini, 2003) that
in all games in which players actions are strategic complements λ- and γ-core
are non-empty (see also Lardon, 2012) it does not come as a surprise that in a
Cournot oligopoly game in which goods are complements (and actions stra-
tegic complements) the core is non-empty if remaining firms form a sufficient
number of coalitions in response to a deviation.
(ii) In the Industrial Organization literature some papers have studied the
propensity of firms to merge in a linear Stackelberg quantity setting. In a
symmetric generalized Stackelberg oligopoly model, Daughety (1990) shows
that a merger made by two followers and forming only one firm acting as leader
can be profitable and welfare-enhancing. In the same setting Huck et al. (2001)
shows that a merger between a leader and a follower is always profitable.
Escrihuela-Villar and Faulí-Oller (2008) have extended the analysis to the case
in which the firms acting as leaders are more efficient than the firms acting as
followers. They then prove that the efficient leaders rarely have an incentive to
merge. Mergers are shown to be profitable only in two cases: when a leader
incorporates a follower; when two or more followers merge, provided that
their marginal costs are big enough. This occurs because in this case all leaders
reduce their equilibrium outputs and increase the market profitability as a
result.
Driessen et al. (2011) study the non-emptiness of γ-core in a Stackelberg
quantity oligopoly TU-game (i.e. the λ-core) with firms having different
marginal costs. This paper provides necessary and sufficient condition under
which the λ-core is non-empty and also shows that this condition is satisfied
if and only if firms’ marginal costs are not too heterogeneous. Thus, whereas
demand heterogeneity works in favour of the stability of the grand coalition
(see point (ii) above), cost heterogeneity works against.
(iii) Adopting Bloch’s (1995) model of cost-reducing alliances in a Cour-
not oligopoly, Belleflamme (2000) explores the consequences of heterogeneous
firms in a simultaneous open membership game of coalition formation. It is
well known (e.g. Bloch, 1997; Yi, 1997) that, with symmetric firms, the only
Nash equilibrium of the open membership game of coalition formation implies
the formation of the grand coalition. This is because the benefits of coopera-
tion increases linearly with the size of the coalition and, therefore, in an open
membership game there is no reason to remain out of the industry-wide
association of firms. Belleflamme (2000) shows that this result extends to the
case with asymmetric associations but not to the case with symmetric associa-
tions and asymmetric firms. In particular, when firms obtain different benefits
in joining an association, several associations might form or a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium coalition structure might even fail to exists. When both
associations and firms are allowed to be asymmetric, the author shows that, if
at most two associations can form, there exists a coalition proof Nash equi-
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librium in which these two coalitions are formed and all members of the
associations have a higher taste for the association than all non-members do.
5.2 Information Sharing Agreements
In this final section we wish to discuss the issue of private information in
the context of oligopoly games, mergers and alliances. A recent contribution
by Amir et al. (2009) has studied the effect of private information held by
merging firms about the post-merger unit production cost, i.e. about effi-
ciency gains from merging. The main point of the paper is to show that when
efficiency gains are believed to exist with sufficiently high likelihood, then
mergers become profitable even if such efficiency gains fail to materialize.
The key ingredient here is the increased market power of the merger due to its
private information about post-merger costs, and the consequent inability of
fringe firms to fine-tune their market behaviour to the merger’s true cost
conditions.
A large theoretical body of work has investigated another aspect on
which private information plays a role in oligopolies. This literature builds
on the consideration that when oligopolistic firms have private information
about either market demand or technological conditions, communication
and cooperation can be beneficial even in the absence of collusion in pricing
strategies. Firms may in fact face incentives to share their own private infor-
mation prior to non-collusive market competition, either to all or to a subset
of competitors. Understanding such incentives has strong policy relevance,
as it can guide regulative intervention by suggesting whether evidence of
information sharing should or should not be interpreted as evidence of
market collusion (see Kuhn and Vives’s (1995) report on the EU industry).
For this reason this problem has received vast attention in the theoretical
Industrial Organization literature, where game theoretic models of incom-
plete information have been employed to disentangle the forces that finally
result in the incentives to disclose or share one’s private information. Most
papers have dealt with situations where information is shared prior to the
realization of uncertainty (the ex-ante case), so that the decision of disclosing
does not signal anything on one’s own private information. There have been
a few attempts to deal with the interim case, that we do not cover in this
survey.
The technology of information sharing has been modelled in essentially
two ways. In the strategic model, each firm decides whether to disclose its
own information to other firms, and receives the information of all other
disclosing firms irrespective of its own disclosure decision. This model is well
described as a game in which firms unilaterally set their disclosure strategy,
and expected pay-offs depend on the disclosure strategy of all firms in the
market. In the contractual model, firms share information with competitors
on a quid pro quo basis: by refusing to disclose one’s own information firms
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also loose the information of other disclosing firms. In this model informa-
tion is a ‘club good’ from which non-disclosing firms are excluded. In this
sense, the contractual model leads itself to an analysis based on games of
coalition formation, where firms can form information sharing coalitions
and exclude other firms from their private information. Within this second
approach, however, the literature has mostly looked at the bare comparison
between the universal sharing of information (industry wide agreement)
and the complete absence of sharing, interpreting the difference in expected
pay-offs as the incentives to form a trade association for the industry. A few
exceptions that we will discuss below have looked at the incentives to form
smaller sharing coalitions.
A simple and basic model is sketched as follows. There are n oligopolists
producing with no cost, and a linear demand:
p A y yi i j
j i
= + − −
≠
∑( )τ γ (36)
where A is a constant τ is a random variable distributed normally with zero
mean and variance t. The parameter γ measures the effect on the price faced
by firm i of the aggregate quantity produced by the other firms (an index of
firms’ products’ differentiation γ = 1 and γ = 0 correspond to the polar cases
of perfect substitutes and of perfectly differentiated goods, respectively).
Private information is modelled as follows. Each firm i receives a private
noisy signal si about the state of the world τ, with yi = τ + ηi, where the noise
ηi is normally distributed with zero mean, variance u and covariance un ≥ 0. In
the strategic model, each firm decides whether to (or to what extent) disclose
its private signal, and each firm observes its own signal and the signal dis-
closed by other firms, independently of its disclosure strategy. In the contrac-
tual model, an industry-wide agreement is the scenario where all firms share
their private signal with all other firms, so that each firm takes its market
decision observing all n signals about the demand intercept. In the complete
absence of information sharing, each firm i takes its market decision observ-
ing only its private signal si. In both models, market competition (modelled as
a second stage of a two-stage game) results in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium
in which firms information depends on disclosure strategies in the first stage.
It can be shown that a firm’s equilibrium profit in the Cournot game is an
affine function of the variance of its own equilibrium quantity.
One first key insight from the pioneering works of Novshek and
Sonnenschein (1982), Clarke (1983), Vives (1985), Li (1985) and Gal-or (1985)
is that firms competing on quantity face no incentive to share their private
information on a common demand intercept demand, unless they produce
highly differentiated products.10 In particular, when products are homoge-
10Raith (1996) provides a detailed analysis of the role of both the type (common versus private)
and the precision of private information in determining incentives.
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neous (γ = 1) it is dominant not to disclose information in the strategic model,
and it is not profitable to share information in an industry-wide association in
the contractual model. The forces behind this result can be understood as
follows. The exchange of private information on demand conditions has
two main effects on equilibrium play. On one hand, firms receiving additional
information refine their expectation about the state of the world; this effect is
always beneficial in terms of expected profit. On the other hand, information
sharing increases the correlation of strategies in equilibrium; this second effect
is detrimental to profits when strategies are substitutes, and beneficial when
strategies are complements. In the strategic model, Cournot oligopolists find it
dominant to conceal their own private signal, since this avoids the second
negative effect (due to strategic substitutability), without losing the first
positive one. In the contractual model, concealing one’s own information
comes at the cost of loosing other firms’ disclosed information, and incentives
to share finally depend on the magnitude of the two effects above. In particu-
lar, the negative effect of increasing the correlation of strategies by disclosing
becomes less and less important as products’ differentiation increases and,
as a consequence, as strategic substitution in the game is weakened. Similar
considerations lead to the conclusion that Bertrand oligopolists (playing a
game with strategic complements) always find it dominant to disclose their
own information.
The conclusion that (at least under mild product differentiation)
Cournot oligopolists find it optimal not to form an industry-wide agreement
does not exhaust the analysis of cooperative information sharing in the
contractual model. Indeed, even if industry-wide agreements are not profit-
able, smaller scale agreements, where members’ information has the feature
of a club good, may still be profitable. The issue of smaller scale agreements
has been first raised by Malueg and Tsutsui (1996), where it is shown that
not only industry-wide agreements can be profitable and immune to indi-
vidual defections when products are strongly differentiated, but also that a
coalitional agreement by a subset of firms can be stable to defections (more
precisely, can be a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium). Their result is obtained
in the framework of a three-firm model, and fails to predict information
sharing of any kind when products are strongly homogeneous. In a recent
contribution to this literature, Currarini and Feri (2013) have shown that the
formation of smaller coalitions of firms can be profitable even in a linear
Cournot model with perfectly homogeneous products. Their main result rests
on the role of the conditional correlation of private signals on firms’ incen-
tives to share information in small coalitions. In terms of the above sketched
model, they consider the case in which un > 0. They show that the complete
absence of information sharing is not a stable scenario when the formation of
small coalitions is allowed, and some extent of information sharing is there-
fore a property of all equilibria. The basic intuition behind this result goes
as follows. When firms’ private information is (conditionally) correlated,
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the exchange of information within a small coalition of firms has the effect
of refining these firms’ expectation about all outside firms’ signals (and
behaviour). This refinement results from the assumed conditional correlation
of signals, and comes at ‘no cost’, since it does not require any revelation of
the sharing firms’ information to the outside competitors. The magnitude
of the resulting increase in expected profits is larger the larger the number of
firms outside the sharing coalition. Hence the result: if signal are condition-
ally correlated and the number of firms is large enough, then there exists a
subcoalition of firms for which information sharing is profitable.
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we have reviewed various approaches taken to investigate the
emergence of firms’ associations and market collusion in oligopoly. The
particular focus of this survey was on the role of coalitions of firms both in
the formation and in the dissolution of an agreement. We have identified two
types of models. Those that study under which conditions an industry-wide
agreement can emerge and be sustained, leading to a factual monopoly, and
those that study conditions under which firms organize in smaller and pos-
sibly multiple coalitions, giving rise to a concentrated oligopoly structure. We
have seen how the stability of an industry-wide agreements crucially depends
on the conjectures that smaller coalitions make on the behaviour of outside
players. In the linear Cournot model, pessimistic conjectures such as the α
and β or even the γ generate stable industry-wide agreements, even when
firms that defect from a cartel can exploit a first mover advantage, in which
case stability requires an equal sharing of profits within the cartel. More
optimistic conjectures such as the δ imply that collusion cannot be sustained
in one-shot market interaction. Models that study the emergence of smaller
and multiple coalitions of firms adopt stability notions that are either based
on individual revisions by single firms (such as those based on external and
internal stability) or that model coalition formation as a full-fledged game
of announcements. We have seen that the well-known conjecture that only
cartels covering for a large enough share of the market are stable is confirmed
in most approaches, with the exception of models where timing is a crucial
issue for how coalitions revise their strategies. In particular, when revisions
can also affect the timing of play in a Cournot game, stable cartels need to
include the whole industry, and imply that collusion is not delayed. A partial
counterpart is obtained in Bertand competition, where strategies are comple-
ments and successful collusion requires a delay between the announcement
and the implementation of strategies.
Future research on these issues seem to be directed towards a better mix
of theoretical modelling and empirical evidence, naturally leading towards
models that encompass crucial aspects of real markets such as firms’ hetero-
geneity, uncertainty and private information. While heterogeneity is certainly
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a difficult aspect to incorporate in theoretical models, one possibly fruitful
direction would be to work with statistical models, where equilibrium is
derived as a function of firms’ distribution, very much along similar lines
as followed in the study of behaviour on networks. Interesting questions
concerning the role of heterogeneity could be addressed in terms of first and
second-order shifts in the distribution of firms’ characteristics, possibly with
results that would crucially depend on the strategic nature of firms’ interac-
tion (complements versus substitutes). The study of complex market struc-
tures with possibly intransitive relations (e.g. networks) would also add some
understanding in contexts where firms’ collaboration need not be limited
on a single issue, and firms may collude with different partners in different
markets. We leave these and other issues for our current and future research.
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